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Even with a good surveillance program, nosocomial infec-
tions may be not recognized because of several reasons: absence
of symptoms or prolonged incubation period (eg, viral bloodborne
infections, tuberculosis); problems with the microbiological diag-
nosis, because adequate specimens may be difficult to obtain or
special methods should be used (eg, fungal infections, virus, new
agents); shorter hospital stays (eg, surgical-site infections); diffi-
culty in distinguishing between nosocomial and community-
acquired infections (eg, influenza); and failure to detect clinically
relevant colonization (eg, multiresistant microorganisms).
Because of the important potential consequences of occult noso-
comial infections, specific surveillance programs should be
designed to address these problems (Infect Control Hosp Epidemi-
ol 1998;19:593-596).
The exact incidence and burden of nosocomial infec-
tions are not known and are not likely ever to be so. The
methods used for surveillance are the main determinants
affecting the reliable detection of nosocomial infections.
Even with extensive active and passive case-finding meth-
ods, some cases will remain undetected because of the
very nature of the infection. Several possible reasons for
this are summarized in Table 1.
LONG INCUBATION PERIOD,
ASYMPTOMATIC INFECTIONS
Some infections may remain asymptomatic for a
long period of time, if not forever. Even asymptomatic
infections may have important consequences in terms of
transmission.1 Examples of pathogens responsible for this
type of presentation are bloodborne viruses, such as
hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), cytomegalovirus,
mycobacteria, and prions.
For HBV, the incubation period varies from 4 to 28
weeks, and only 40% to 50% of patients will present with an
icteric phase. Many of the hepatitis B surface antigen
(HBsAg) carriers do not recall any symptomatic disease.
Hepatitis C virus has an incubation of 20 to 90 days, and
only 25% of cases will present with icteric hepatitis. Nowa-
days, these diseases presumably are rarely acquired noso-
comially because of the systematic testing of blood transfu-
sions and graft donors, and because of the use of standard-
ized procedures for the disinfection of instruments or
devices that may transmit the virus from patient to patient.
However, this still may occur if these procedures are not
followed, as illustrated recently by the transmission of HCV
through inappropriately treated endoscopes.2,3 It is easy to
understand that such cases will be very difficult to recog-
nize in the absence of clear circumstantial evidence and a
careful epidemiological evaluation. Bloodborne agents also
can be transmitted by carriers among healthcare workers
(HCWs) performing invasive procedures. Several dozens
of clusters of HBV infections linked to dentists or surgeons
infected by HBV have been described. In 1992, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) investigated 33
such reports, which involved 9 dentists, 20 surgeons, and 4
other HCWs, responsible for a total of 330 cases. Most of
these reports involved dentists and surgeons who were
both HBsAg- and hepatitis B e antigen (HBeAg)-positive.
The risk of transmission was estimated to be 0.06 per 100
procedures. In a recent report, four surgeons who were
HBsAg-positive but HBeAg-negative were found to be
responsible for 5 cases among 216 investigated patients.4
With the widespread use of HBV vaccination of HCWs and
with the introduction of universal childhood vaccination,
this problem probably will become negligible in developed
countries in the future. However, there still will be a very
long transition phase during which the risk will persist
because presently practicing surgeons and dentists may
have contracted the infection before vaccination was imple-
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mented.
Hepatitis C virus also can be transmitted from HCWs
to patients, but there are only a few reports.5-7 The risk of
transmission of HCV from patients to HCWs after percuta-
neous exposure appears to be similar to the risk of trans-
mission from HBsAg-positive but HBeAg-negative source
patients (2%-10%). Thus, the risk of transmission from
HCWs to patients is probably low.
The risk of nosocomial transmission of HIV from
HIV-infected HCWs to patients has been assessed exten-
sively following a report of a dentist who had been impli-
cated in the transmission of HIV to five of his patients.6
Among 22,171 tested patients treated by 51 HIV-positive
healthcare workers, 113 HIV-positive patients were found.8
Twenty-eight were infected prior to the procedure. Most of
the 85 remaining patients had established or potential risk
factors. In 16 of the 23 cases without risk factors, cross-
infection was excluded by sequencing of the HIV strains.
Thus, although a few cases were not investigated com-
pletely, no case of transmission was documented. In anoth-
er investigation of an HIV-positive surgeon in France, trans-
mission was documented in 1 of 968 investigated patients
(unpublished data, report to the French Health General
Direction, December 1996). From these studies, it is con-
cluded that the risk of transmission from HIV-infected
HCWs to patients is very low.
Tuberculosis is another infection where nosocomial
acquisition may be unnoticed or underestimated because of
the long incubation period, which may preclude clear epi-
demiological links with the hospitalization, and because
only 5% to 10% of infections eventually will lead to disease.
Many published clusters or outbreaks show that cases
often are discovered only after an extensive investigation.
Often, months may have elapsed before the outbreak is rec-
ognized, sometimes involving many patients whose links
are established only retrospectively.9-11 Detection of such
clusters for outbreaks may be complicated by the fact that
patients may be rehospitalized in different hospitals.12
Moreover, the exposure to the infectious patient may occur
during a very brief encounter, such as staying in the same
outpatient room, an event that may not be traced.13 Noso-
comial acquisition of tuberculosis among HCWs also can
be underestimated seriously unless a good and systematic
tuberculin testing program is in place. The main compo-
nent of prevention of tuberculosis is early detection and
treatment of cases, adequate ventilation of hospital areas
where tuberculosis patients may stay and respiratory isola-
tion of cases until the infection is controlled adequately.
These measures certainly reduce the risk of occult nosoco-
mial tuberculosis considerably.14,15
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is another example
of a disease for which nosocomial transmission may be dif-
ficult to trace. Inappropriate sterilization of surgical instru-
ments, contaminated human growth hormone, and corneal
transplants have been implicated in such cases.16,17 The
investigations of these outbreaks have shown that recogni-
tion of the problem has taken months to years and has been
difficult because of the long incubation of the disease and
because some patients already may have died before recog-
nition of problem. Because inactivation of prions requires
special sterilization and disinfection procedures, and
because no one knows how many persons are potentially
incubating the new variant of CJD, very careful surveil-
lance and control programs should be implemented in
order to detect and prevent potential nosocomial transmis-
sion, whether by instruments or by other routes such as
grafts or, potentially, by transfusion. A recent report on 405
patients who were part of population-based studies done
between 1993 and 1995 in Europe showed that a history of
surgery or medical treatment was not a risk factor for
CJD.18
INFECTIONS DIFFICULT TO DIAGNOSE
Although many infectious diseases can be picked up
by standard microbiological tests, some agents may be dif-
ficult to detect, either because deep specimens need to be
obtained or because specific tests should be ordered. For
example, invasive aspergillosis is difficult to diagnose,
especially at an early stage. Only tissue specimens can pro-
vide definite proof and often cannot be obtained, even if the
diagnosis is suspected. Invasive aspergillosis often is an
autopsy finding. Given the declining rate of autopsies in
many centers and the widespread use of empirical antifun-
gal therapy, the true incidence of aspergillosis may be
grossly underestimated.
It is estimated that viruses contribute to at least 5% of
all nosocomial infections,19 but this is probably an under-
estimate, because appropriate diagnostic tests may not
exist or may not be ordered, especially because they are
expensive and often have no therapeutic implications. With
the continued development of rapid viral diagnostic meth-




Asymptomatic disease CMV, HBV, HCV
Long incubation period HIV, HBV, HCV, mycobacteria, prions
Difficulty or lack of Fungi, some virus, new pathogens, 
diagnosis Legionella
Short hospitalization stay Surgical-site infections
Possible nosocomial Pneumocystis carinii
transmission





Abbreviations: CMV, cytomegalovirus; HBV, hepatitis B virus; HCV, hepatitis C virus; HIV,
human immunodeficiency virus.
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comial infection will be recognized increasingly.
Another example of a nosocomial infection that may
be unrecognized is Legionella pneumophila. We recently
encountered such a situation in our onco-hematological unit.
For many years, the water system was monitored for the
presence of L pneumophila, according to the methods pro-
posed by the CDC, and no Legionella species were found.
After the discovery of two cases with positive cultures
diagnosed 18 months apart but harboring the same pulsed-
field gel electrophoresis pattern, we initiated a retrospec-
tive sero-epidemiological study, taking advantage of the fact
that weekly serum samples are obtained and frozen from
patients hospitalized in this unit. Among 153 hospitalized
and investigated patients during an 18-month period, 7
additional cases of legionellosis were diagnosed on the
basis of a fourfold increase in antibody titers during hospi-
talization. Clinically, these cases presented as a febrile neu-
tropenic episode and were treated empirically, without spe-
cific tests ordered for the detection of Legionella. This illus-
trates that an unremarkable clinical presentation and an
environmental control of insufficient sensitivity may ham-
per proper recognition of a problem due to certain
pathogens such as Legionella species.
Finally, inadequate laboratory methods may account
for underdiagnosed or unrecognized nosocomial infections
or problems. A typical example is the use of suboptimal
methods for the detection of antibiotic resistance, such as
methicillin-resistance in Staphylococcus aureus.
SHORT HOSPITALIZATION STAY
During the last 15 years, there has been a consider-
able reduction in the mean duration of hospital stay due to
cost constraints and improvements in the healthcare deliv-
ery system; however, the incubation time of infectious dis-
eases has not changed. Because many diagnostic and ther-
apeutic procedures that are risk factors for infections are
performed during the first few days of hospitalization, the
reduced duration of the hospital stay will result in an
increasing proportion of patients becoming symptomatic
after discharge. This problem typically is illustrated by
infections of the surgical site.20 Only a surveillance pro-
gram including an active and systematic tracing of infec-
tions will uncover infections that may become symptomatic
after discharge, and patients may not necessarily come




For some infections, it may be difficult to differenti-
ate nosocomial from community acquisition, especially
when an epidemic is ongoing in the community. Typical
examples are influenza virus, respiratory syncytial virus,
and rotavirus infections.21,22 In fact, any disease that can
be acquired in the community also potentially can be
acquired in hospitals if the appropriate mode of transmis-
sion exists. This was illustrated above with the examples of
tuberculosis and bloodborne viruses.
For certain infections, the reservoir and the mode of
transmission are not known exactly, and existence of noso-
comial acquisition is controversial. This is illustrated by the
case for Pneumocystis carinii. The reservoir of human pneu-
mocystosis is believed to be the human being, but human-to-
human transmission never has been proven. Clinical cases
are believed to result either from reactivation or from the
recent acquisition of P carinii. Clusters of cases observed in
hospitals have been described, but the exact epidemiological
link between cases has not been elucidated. At this stage,
there are no firm recommendations for limiting transmission
in hospitals.23 The issue of cross-contamination should be
investigated further in order to define the reservoir and
route of transmission better and to establish the real propor-
tion of cases that may be considered as nosocomial.
COLONIZATION
Unrecognized colonization is a very important deter-
minant of nosocomial infections, particularly with multire-
sistant pathogens such as methicillin-resistant S aureus
(MRSA) and vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE).
Readmitted patients colonized with MRSA are known to be
one of the main sources contributing to persistence of
MRSA in hospitals. Surveillance of colonization by certain
pathogens is an impossible task, except in some limited and
targeted situations, particularly in case of outbreaks or as a
strategy to control MRSA and VRE.
CONSEQUENCES OF OCCULT
NOSOCOMIAL INFECTIONS
There are several potential consequences of occult
nosocomial infections (Table 2). Inadequate assessment of
the problem will result in inappropriate preventive mea-
sures. This is illustrated by the Legionella cases reported
above: in the absence of an identified problem, the envi-
ronmental monitoring for Legionella was thought to be reli-
able. After identification of the problem, we found that the
method proposed by the CDC for water monitoring was not
sensitive enough, and we replaced it with swabs of outlets
and showers as recently recommended by Yu et al.24
Unsuspected asymptomatic infections such as those
caused by bloodborne viruses might be transmitted by sex-
ual contacts outside the hospital. Unrecognized tuberculosis
TABLE 2
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF OCCULT NOSOCOMIAL INFECTIONS
Infection of the patient
Inadequate assessment of the problem with inappropriate 
preventive measures
Transmission to other patients or to healthcare workers
Transmission to the family, etc
Inappropriate attribution of costs
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may lead to cases in other patients or healthcare workers. In
case an infection is not correctly attributed to a nosocomial
origin, the cost might not be charged to the appropriate
payer. Finally, the nosocomial origin of certain infections
might be found at a later stage and may trigger lawsuits.18
Transmission of HIV and HCV infections through blood
transfusions illustrates this important potential problem.
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Investigators from Hunter Holmes
McGuire Veterans’ Affairs Medical Center
(VAMC) conducted a prospective, obser-
vational cohort study to characterize the
impact of hospitalwide clindamycin restric-
tion on the incidence of Clostridium diffi-
cile-associated diarrhea (CDAD).
Clinical data were corrected on hos-
pitalized patients with symptomatic diar-
rhea, and data on antibiotic use were
obtained from hospital pharmacy records.
An outbreak of CDAD was caused by a
clonal isolate of clindamycin-resistant C
difficile and was associated with increased
use of clindamycin. Hospitalwide require-
ment of approval by an infectious disease
consultant of clindamycin use led to an
overall reduction in clindamycin use, a sus-
tained reduction in the mean number of
cases of CDAD (11.5 cases/month vs 3.33
cases/month; P<.001), and an increase in
clindamycin susceptibility among C diffi-
cile isolates (9% vs 61%; P<.001). Although
a parallel increase was noted in the use of
other antibiotics with antianaerobic activi-
ty, including cefotetan, ticarcillin-clavu-
lanate, and imipenem-cilastin, the hospital
realized overall cost savings due to the
decreased incidence of CDAD. 
The authors concluded that hospital
formulary restriction of clindamycin is an
effective way to decrease CDAD. It also
can lead to a return in clindamycin sus-
ceptibility among isolates and can effect
cost savings to the hospital. 
FROM: Climo MW, Israel DS, Wong
ES, Williams D, Coudron P, Markowitz
SM. Hospital-wide restriction of clin-
damycin: effect on the incidence of
Clostridium dif ficile-associated diarrhea
and cost. Ann Intern Med 1998;128(12 pt
1):989-995. 
Clindamycin Restriction Decreases Clostridium difficile-Associated Diarrhea
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